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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) by assignment from the Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
The following issue is presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the Appellant's 
motion for an extension to disclose expert witnesses, which is 
tantamount to a dismissal given the necessary nature of the experts to 
prove the Appellant's case. 
Standard of Review for Issue 1.: A trial court's denial of a motion to 
extend the time to disclose expert witnesses is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71, 7 (Utah 1999) 
Preservation of Issue 1: This issue was preserved by the Appellant's 
Third Motion to Amend Scheduling Order to Allow More Time For 
Disclosure of Experts with the accompanying memoranda. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling 
or pretrial order, if not appearance is made on behalf of a party at a 
scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party or party's attorney is 
substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or if a party or 
party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court upon 
l 
motion or its own initiative, may take any actions authorized under 
Rule 37(b)(2). 
2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 36. 
(a)(1) ... pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted 
unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may 
allow.... 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which actions are pending. If a party fails 
to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) ... unless the party finds 
that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the 
action is pending may take such actions in regard to the failure as are 
just including the following: 
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or 
opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding 
or any part thereof, or render judgment by default against the 
disobedient party; 
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
4. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 40 
(b) Postponement. The court may postpone a trial for good 
upon such terms as are just, including the payment of costs. 
5. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56 
(e) ... When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, and adverse party may not 
rest upon mere allegations or denial of the pleadings, but the 
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response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from District Court Decision rendered on June 10, 2009 
denying the Appellant/Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Lippman") third motion to 
amend the scheduling order to allow more time for disclosure of experts. 
This case stems from a real estate transaction in Ogden, where 
Lippman sued various parties over fraudulent leases provided by the Deem 
Defendants in order to entice Lippman into buying the real estate for 
substantially more than it was actually worth. 
Lippman's claim is that the actual property was worth far less than 
what he paid, because the fraudulent long term leases provided by the Deem 
Defendants artificially gave the property value it did not have. 
Lippman's claims include several against rhe Appellees/ Defendants 
(hereinafter "Salkin") on the basis that Salkin was acting as his real estate 
agent and failed to use the due diligence necessary to help Lippman avoid 
the fraudulent transaction. Much of the dispute in this case is not only about 
whether Salkin acted negligently but whether he was in fact Lippman's 
agent as Salkin is licensed agent in California and not in Utah. 
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Because of the nature of the case, Lippman consulted with Brandon 
Wood, a commercial real estate agent, to determine the issues of agency and 
liability. Originally, Mr. Wood was to be the expert witness, but shortly 
before the deadline for expert disclosures came, Mr. Wood decided that he 
would not act as the expert witness. This left Lippman without a vital expert 
witness for the case. 
After the case got started, Lippman hired Rick Lifferth, a certified 
commercial appraiser, to address the issue of lost value based upon the 
actual value as opposed to the false leases. Mr. Lifferth began his appraisal 
work and was unable to provide the final report before the deadline for 
disclosure was to pass. 
Based upon both unforeseen circumstances, Lippman was unable to 
make the deadline under the existing scheduling order and motioned the trial 
court for more time. It is under these circumstances that the issue for appeal 
arose. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case was filed on May 30, 2006. Through various motions and 
hearings, Lippman has obtained judgment against all the other defendants 
but Salkin and one defendant whose claims have been abandoned. During 
this time, discovery has been conducted, motions filed, and pleadings 
amended. 
On April 1,2008, due to the unforeseen circumstances previously 
provided, Lippman filed his first motion to extend the expert discovery 
deadline that was due that day. Lippman made concerted effort to find 
another commercial real estate agent as a witness and get the report 
prepared. 
On March 2,2009, Lippman disclosed the experts and their reports, 
and submitted the motion for decision. Salkin objected arguing that the 
motion was not opposed because it only asked for an extension until the end 
of May, 2008. Realizing this oversight, Lippman concurred and submitted a 
second motion to allow Salkin to oppose the motion. Subsequently, the trial 
court ruled on the first motion and denied the motion because it was stale. 
Out of an abundance of caution, Lippman withdrew the second 
motion and filed a third with a thorough explanation of the efforts required 
to find the expert, the need for the experts, and asking for a limited amount 
of time to allow the parties to depose the experts if desired. Salkin filed a 
memorandum in opposition accompanied a certificate of readiness for trial 
and a motion for a final pretrial conference. 
Lippmim filed a *v\)\\ hn'H';in<l n memorandum in opposition to the 
motion for a final pretrial conference stating that the request for a pretrial 
was try and hurry this case to trial without the experts after months of 
limited activity by Salkin. Lippman then submitted the motion to extend the 
disclosure deadlines on Apn* -
( in hint' ,'" J'liH"! Hit (IIHI nun I held ,i pivliiiil confeiencc .mil scl lliu 
case lor In ll ,,M| < H I ' ' ) ' " " ,l I'n i 'v " «" ni'hs ;)f1er the third motion for 
a n extension had been submitted the trial court denied the motion and stated 
among other things that the case had been set for trial. 
The order is was filled with factual inaccuracies, void any meaningful 
legal analysis, and was based upon
 Siie premise tha t . ippman J C ^ C v,: 
harsh treatment based urn an idini" nl lUiiimim iiidi'iiu'iit aiMin^l 
nllii'i 1 >e .- . • i • * -. • = VvndanlN 
DISPOS'llQN IN COL'Rl 3.KL(„)V\ 
On June 10, 2009 the trial court denied Lippman's third motion to 
extend the time to disclose expert witnesses. This order was granted 
interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMEN r OF FAC I S 
I III!-, ease w ,is i Hifiiimlh (ilci 1« Hi Ma.)/ 30. 20*!- ! 
2. Early in the case there was a flurry of activity including a motion to 
dismiss, a Rule 56(f) motion for discovery, and a motion for leave to 
amend the complaint with its accompanying amended complaint. (R. 
137; 172; 201; 334) 
3. It wasn't until March 30, 2007 that the first scheduling order was put 
into place. (R. 450) 
4. After that order was put into place, more discovery was conducted and 
the parties moved forward. (R. 491-782) 
5. During this time, the scheduling order was amended two more times 
on October 19, 2007 and February 7, 2008. (R. 614; 1099) 
6. In the last amended scheduling order, the parties were given until 
April 1 and May 1, 2008 to disclose expert witnesses and provide any 
reports. (R. 1101) 
7. On April 1, 2008, recognizing the deadline for experts was upon him, 
Lippman filed a motion and a supporting memorandum for more time 
to get expert witnesses. (R. 1892-1899) 
8. In that motion, the Lippman explained that he had retained a certified 
MAI and SRA appraiser to provide an appraisal for and be an expert 
in the case. The appraiser contacted Lipmann's counsel and stated 
that for unforeseen circumstances including his wife's surgery, he 
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would In,1 uniiNc In pin\ n\c \m expert report b \ svn\ I, 2008. (R. 
1896) 
9. Also in that motion, Lippman explained that he had also engaged a 
commercial real estate agent, Brandon Wood, to be an expert witness 
in the case as well, and the deaaime approacnea, : 
out ;11111 jjave sonic references ! - ! * K > ^ > 
10 Reali/iiit11 thai f1 Hi I iflertli tin; appraiser would not 'be ready and 
havmg not found a replacement witness for Mr. Wood, Lippman 
asked the Court in the motion for t ime until the end of Ma} , 2008 to 
disclose the witnesses. (R, 1886) 
11 T I ^ motion went unopposed until submitted i n k lai ch of 2009 (R 
233 i) 
ppniiin thru < w n( in si, ,ih, h ul .i ii< w \ oiiinuMvinl real estate ayent 
that could serve as an expert witness. Lippmaii had an extraordinarily 
difficult t ime finding a replacement for Mr. Wood. (R 2382) 
13.1 ippman resorted to phone book searches., internet searches and calls 
to complete strangers in an effort to find an expert. 
called llie leal i>' ik UHIIIIIISMOII <IH'I feal eslafi/ *;i ' i 
finding an expe i It * i II this \ \ as t :> ii 3 a \ ail (R 2382) 
14.Finally, through conversation with an attorney in Salt Lake City, 
Lippman was able to find Mr. Florence who was willing to serve as an 
expert. (R. 2382) 
15.After multiple meeting with Mr. Florence, Lippman finally was able 
to move forward and disclose his experts. (R. 2383) 
16.On March 2,2009, Lipmann submitted his motion for an extension 
filed the previous year, filed a motion and memorandum for a 
scheduling conference, and disclosed his expert witnesses and their 
reports to opposing counsel. (R. 2295-97; 2322-34) 
17.On March 6,2009, Salkin filed an objection to the proposed order, 
rightfully explaining that Salkin had not opposed the motion because 
Lippman had only asked until May 31, 2008 to disclose experts. (R. 
2332) 
18.On March 13, 2009, Lippman filed a response acknowledging the 
mistake and simultaneous with that acknowledgment filed a second 
motion in order to allow opposing parties to oppose the motion. (R. 
2358-59; 2348-2357) 
19.On March 16,2009, the Court denied the request for a scheduling 
conference. (R. 2367) 
20. Also on March 16, 2009, the Court denied the Plaintiffs first motion 
for more time to disclose an expert because the motion was "stale and, 
given the age of the case, inappropriate." (R. 2369) 
21 .Given the Court's ruling that the first motion was stale, Lippman 
withdrew his second motion and filed a third motion and 
memorandum for more time to more specifically address the Court's 
ruling that the motion was stale on March 24, 2009. (R. 2374-88) 
22.In the third motion, Lippman went into in depth explanation as to why 
it had taken so long to find an expert and the good faith effort that he 
had expended in order to find Mr. Florence to be the new expert. (R. 
2382-83) 
23.In the third motion, Lippman also explained the necessity for the 
expert witnesses the prejudice caused by excluding these witnesses. 
(R. 2384-86) 
24.Further, Lippman asked for an extension beyond the original date in 
the first motion to address the issue of staleness. (R. 2386) 
25.On March 31, 2009, Salkin responded to the third motion by not only 
filing a memorandum in opposition, but by filing a motion for a final 
pretrial conference and a certificate of readiness for trial. (R. 2395-
2414) 
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26.Prior to this time, other than conducting discovery, opposing a few 
motions, and by filing a motion for summary judgment early on 
Salkin had done very little to move the case forward to trial. Prior to 
this time, Salkin had not filed a certificate of readiness or for any 
pretrial conference. (See Record Generally) 
27.On April 1, 2009, Lippman filed is reply memorandum and submitted 
the motion on April 9, 2009. (R. 2415-24). 
28.On April 10, 2009, Lippman filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
request for a final pretrial conference, arguing that a pretrial 
conference may be appropriate, but that a final pretrial conference was 
inappropriate and the timing was such that it was an attempt 
circumvent the Lippman's motion for more time to disclose experts. 
(R 2425-29) 
29.In spite of Lippman's opposition to the pretrial conference, the trial 
court held a pretrial conference on June 2, 2009 and set the case for 
trial in October of 2009. (R. 2436) 
30.Finally, on June 10,2009, the trial court entered an order on 
Lippman's motion which was submitted two months earlier. (R. 
2441) 
31. This is the order on appeal. (R. 2441 -42) 
n 
32.In the order, the trial court states that the Second Motion to Amend 
was never submitted to the trial court and that the motion asked for an 
expert deadline of May 31, 2008. (R. 2441) 
33. While it is true that the Second Motion was never submitted, it was 
the First Motion to Amend that asked for the May 31,2008 deadline 
and it was submitted to the Court and denied because it was stale. (R. 
2296-97; 2367) 
34. For this reason, Lippman withdrew the second motion and filed the 
third motion to address the issue of staleness. (R. 2374-88) 
35.In the order, the trial court complains that the third motion does not 
specify for how long Lippman needed an extension. (R. 2441) 
36.In the memorandum in support, Lippman explains that he "has found 
an expert and provided the reports now and is asking the Court to 
except those reports by extending the deadline." (R. 2383-84) 
37.In the reply, Lippman further explained the need and timing by asking 
the "Court give the parties limited time to conduct deposition if 
desired." (R. 2420) 
38.In the order, the trial court suggested that the Defendants would be 
prejudiced by reopening discovery and "by causing additional expense 
and delay in the trial which has already been scheduled." (R. 1441) 
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39. The trial court provides no factual reasoning for why the expense 
would be anymore than what would have been required had the 
experts been disclosed by the original deadline. (R. 2441-42) 
40.The trial court also held that granting the motion would delay the set 
trial date. (R. 2441) 
41. The trial date was set on June 2,2009 based upon a pretrial request 
and a certificate of readiness for trial submitted with the Defendant's 
memorandum in opposition to Lippman's third motion. (R. 2436; 
2395-2414) 
42. Lippman's third motion was submitted to the trial court for decision 
on April 9,2009, nearly two months prior to the trial date being set. 
(R. 2422-23) 
43.The trial date was set nearly two months after the motion for more 
time was submitted to the trial court for decision. (R 2436, 2422-23) 
44.The trail court then addresses Lippman's necessity for expert 
witnesses by suggesting that Lippman was not lenient in his treatment 
of the Deem Defendants as to the summary judgment motion based 
upon deemed admissions and cannot ask for lenience now and that 
Lippman should have lined up his expert prior to filing the case. (R. 
2442) 
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45.On May 16, 2007 Lippman sent the Deem Defendant's discovery 
requests including requests to admit. (R. 1124-25) 
46.On June 20, 2007, the Deem Defendants requested additional time to 
answer the requests and Lippman extended the time to answer until 
July 6, 2007. (R. 1128) 
47. Finally, in February of 2008, Lippman filed a motion for summary 
judgment based in part on deemed admissions. (R. 1120-1243) 
48.Between July 6,2007, the time for the extended deadline, and 
Lippman's motion for summary judgment, the Deem Defendants 
made no motions or requests for more time to answer discovery. (See 
record generally) 
49.In response, the Deem Defendants filed a motion to withdraw the 
deemed admissions with accompanying affidavits. (R. 1720-23) 
50.The trial court held that the Deem Defendants must '"introduce some 
evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that the 
matters deemed admitted against are in fact true.' Defendants failed to 
satisfy this burden, both in written briefs submitted to the Court and in 
oral arguments." (R. 2250 citation omitted) 
51. Ultimately, on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court held 
'Tpllaintiff s statement of facts and the deemed admissions provide a 
14 
basis for undisputed facts which conclusively establish the elements 
of all four causes of action." (R. 2289) 
52.Finally the trial court's assertion that "claims premised on the need for 
expert testimony should be filed based on that expert consultation not 
the other way around," is also questionable in analysis and factually 
inaccurate. (R. 2442) 
53.Lippman in all three motions asking for more time to disclose experts 
informed the trial court that they had an expert who bowed out at the 
last minute and another expert who had a family emergency. (R 1896, 
2352, 2381) 
54. Lippman not only notified the court of the circumstances, but 
disclosed the name of the expert witnesses that he had engaged prior 
to filing the motions. (R 1896, 2352, 2381) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court misconstrued the facts, followed its own interpretation 
of justice when the trial court concluded that denying the motion was fair in 
light of the summary judgment granted earlier in the case, and failed to 
apply the proper legal analysis. 
The trial court erred in denying Lippman's motion for to extend the 
time to disclose expert witnesses, because based upon the facts as they really 
15 
are and the law as it should be applied, the court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO 
DISCLOSE EXPERT WITNESSES. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS. 
In any legal decision made by a trial court, there must be a factual 
basis underlying the application of the law. In the present case, the trial 
court ignored may important facts that had direct relation to making a 
decision and got some of the facts wrong that the trial court relied upon. 
The trial court cannot justify a legal ruling without first understanding and 
properly applying the actual facts to the legal analysis. The trial court failed 
to do so in this case and for this reason alone this Court should reverse and 
remand. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE 
MOTION BASED UPON ITS RULING IN THE 
EARLIER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court in ruling that the motion should be denied, largely 
ignored the actual rubric for determining whether the continuance should be 
granted and instead relied on evening the score with the Deem Defendants. 
By comparing the withdrawing of deemed admissions and the standard for 
16 
summary judgment to the rubric of how to manage the discovery in a case, 
the trial court erred and showed a clear bias towards making the means 
justify the ends. 
Lippman filed his motion for summary judgment against the Deem 
Defendants based upon affidavits testimony and deemed admissions. 
Lippman never expected the Deem Defendants to fail to withdraw the 
deemed admissions and to properly dispute the motion for summary 
judgment. Lippman had already granted an extension to answer the 
admission and only months later filed the motion for summary judgment 
with the expectation the Deem Defendants would put for the effort to 
withdraw the admission and refute the motion for summary judgment. 
Under Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "any matter 
admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on 
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." Utah R. Civ. P. 
36(b). Further, to withdraw admissions, a party must introduce some 
evidence other than mere denial that the admission are in fact untrue. 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors. Inc.. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) 
Under Rule 56 a party opposing summary judgment "must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e). 
17 
The facts and the law are significantly different between the summary 
judgment motion and the motion for more time. When faced with requests 
to admit, the Deem Defendants got an extension and then still failed to 
answer the requests. When faced with a motion for summary judgment 
based upon deemed admissions, the Deem Defendants failed to withdraw the 
admission and to dispute the facts as required. When given multiple 
opportunities to avoid dispositive motions, the Deem Defendants failed to do 
so. When faced with unforeseen expert witness problems, Lippman did 
appropriately motion the trial court to avoid sanctions. More importantly, 
Lippman was never given multiple opportunities or warnings to correct his 
problem. 
Finally, the trial court failed to recognize the legal differences 
between the two motions. When the Deem Defendants were given multiple 
chances to avoid summary judgment through timely admissions, requests for 
extensions, appropriate withdrawals, and proper disputation of the facts on 
summary judgment, the trial court was left with no option but to grant 
summary judgment under Rules 40 and 56. There were no exigent 
circumstances claimed by the Deem Defendants and yet opportunities were 
afforded but not taken. 
18 
When Lippman was faced with discovery deadline in which exigent 
circumstance prohibited timely compliance, he filed a motion and asked for 
an extension. When that motion became moot, he filed two additional 
motions asking for additional time. Under Rule 16 and 37, as explained in 
the next section, the trial court was to use discretion in analyzing the exigent 
circumstances in determining any violation of the scheduling order and 
properly apply the appropriate sanctions, if necessary. The court did neither. 
Instead, the trial court berated and blamed Lippman for the Deem 
Defendants' numerous failures, calling the results Darconian, even though 
such failures were not caused by or expected by Lippman. The trial court 
without regards to the factual and legal distinctions went on to deny 
Lippman's motion for the perceived injustice that Lippman had brought 
upon the Deem Defendants. 
The trial court compared apples to oranges by denying Lippman's 
motion on the basis of comeuppance. As result, the trial court ignored the 
factual and legal distinctions between the two motions. Consequently, the 
trial court abused its discretion by trying to even the score rather than follow 
the law. 
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C. THE TRIAL FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW TO THE 
MOTION. 
Ultimately, the trial court was so focused on making facts that fit the 
trial courts justification and then seeking legal justification that the trial 
court failed to properly analyze this motion under the proper application of 
the law. When the proper facts are applied to the proper legal framework, it 
becomes apparent that the trial court abused its discretion. 
In determining whether to exclude necessary expert witnesses, a trial 
court must evaluate certain factors as to whether or not such exclusion is 
appropriate. These factors include what circumstances lead to the failure to 
comply with the order, what the offending party has done to correct the 
failure, and analysis under Rule 37 as to whether or not such sanctions are 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
At one point and time, excluding necessary expert witnesses was 
deemed inappropriate and an abuse of discretion. Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1980); however, after the changes to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court of Utah rejected the notion that a trial 
court could not exclude necessary expert witnesses. Arnold v. Curtis. 846 
P.2d 1307,1309-10 (Utah 1993) With this rejection came a firm warning 
that while the trial court now has more flexibility, the trial court must 
consider exigent circumstances. The court stated "scheduling orders should 
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never be so inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies that occur..." 
Arnold at 1310. 
In Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71,10 (Utah 1999), the Supreme Court 
of Utah further elaborated on Arnold and presented circumstances where 
exigent circumstances were acceptable and denial of expert witnesses was an 
abuse of discretion. In reevaluation of Arnold the Court stated "[w]e upheld 
the trial court's exclusion of the expert's testimony because the plaintiff filed 
the expert affidavit late and never asked the court to excuse the late 
designation" Id at 10. (emphasis added) In reaffirming the need to address 
exigent circumstances, the Court went on to hold, "unforeseen circumstances 
do arise. On occasion, justice and fairness will require that a court allow a 
party to designate witnesses, conduct discovery, or otherwise perform tasks 
covered by a scheduling order after the court-imposed deadline for doing so 
has expired." Id. 
In Boice. Boice designated an expert witness, Dr. Newton, who 
"decided at the last minute not to testify." Id at 11. Boice moved to 
substitute a new expert before discovery cut offs and two months before the 
scheduled trial date. Marble argued that such an allowance was prejudicial 
that close to trial. The trial court did not allow the new expert. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court could have postponed the trial and 
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offset any prejudice by postponing the trial. The Court held "Given the 
unexpected nature of Newton's withdrawal, and considering all the other 
surrounding circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding Boice's substitute expert's evidence.55 Id at 11-12. 
Like Boice, the Petitioner unexpectedly had one of his expert witness 
decide not to participate in the case right before the disclosure deadline and 
another witness run into family medical issues delaying the report until after 
the disclosure deadline. Like Boice and unlike Arnold, the Petitioner 
motioned the trial court requesting leave to find a new expert. The first 
request was before the disclosure deadline expired. The second and third 
requests were made once an expert was found and before a request for a 
pretrial was even filed with the trial court. 
The trial court sat on the request to submit the third motion to extend 
the time for two months before holding a pretrial conference and setting a 
court date. Then, and only then, the trial court denied the Petitioner's 
motion and stated that a trial date had already been set. Unlike Boice, where 
the motion was made two months before trial, Lippman motioned the trial 
court before a pretrial request was even submitted and two months before 
the trial court even set a trial date. While Lippman technically violated the 
scheduling order by not disclosing experts, the violation was unintentional 
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and unavoidable. 
In deciding what should be done for violations of discovery under 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Court can order what is just 
or any of the sanctions provided for under Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Arnold at 1309; Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d). 
Because the trial court refused to allow essential Lippman's essential 
witnesses to testify, the analysis further fits under Rule 37(b)(2)(B), as stated 
in Rule 16, prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing matter in 
evidence and is tantamount to a dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), because 
the Petitioner will be unable to prove his case. In other words, the Petitioner 
will be "denied to hearing on the merits of his cause." Kilpatrick v. 
Bullough Abatement Inc. 199 P.3d 957, 966 (Utah 2008) For this reason, 
this Court should analyze the denial of the motion as a dismissal under Rule 
37(b)(2)(C). 
In Kilpatrick, the trial court had ordered that Mr. Kilpatrick undergo 
an autopsy upon his death, as it was relevant to the case. Upon Mr. 
Kilpatrick's death, Mrs. Kilpatrick cremated her husband before an autopsy 
could be performed with the explanation that she was distraught and did not 
recall the order. Id at 966. The trial court dismissed. 
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court cited the United States Supreme 
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Court when it held: 
"There are constitutional limitations upon the power of the 
courts ... to dismiss an action without affording a party the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause." The 
Supreme Court has held that rule 37 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure "should not be construed to authorize 
dismissal... when it has established that failure to comply has 
been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any 
fault of the petitioner." 
Id citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et 
Commerciales. S.A. v. Rogers 357 U.S. 197 (1958) 
In Kilpatrick. the defendants asserted that Mrs. Kilpatrick was at fault. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected this notion of "strict liability" and held: 
The strict liability interpretation of "fault" ignores the principle 
that a general term included with a list of more specific terms 
should be given the meaning that is analogous to the other 
terms within the list. In this list, willfulness, bad faith, and 
persistent dilatory tactics all involve intentional behavior. 
Thus, the meaning of "fault" should not be interpreted to 
include unintentional behavior. 
Id at 967. Ultimately, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. Id at 
969. 
The facts and holding in Kilpartick are analogous in this case. While 
the trial court did not dismiss this case, the court might as well have. 
Without the essential expert witnesses it will be difficult if not impossible to 
prove the Petitioner's case. Thus, such a decision is tantamount to a 
dismissal. 
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Further, it is apparent that the Petitioner committed no intentional acts 
that can be attributed to fault under the Kilpatrick analysis. Plain and simply 
put, the Petitioner lost an essential witness right before the deadline for 
disclosures. The Petitioner filed multiple motions to ask the Court for more 
time and went out and found a new expert and promptly disclosed both 
experts' names and their reports. 
Finally, the Court concludes that there would be prejudice to the 
defendants to reopen discovery by causing delay and additional expense. 
The delay is certainly understood. How it is prejudice is not understood, 
especially considering the defendants only filed their certificate of readiness 
and request for a pretrial after the third motion to extend the time was filed. 
The additional expense argument is not understood. Certainly, if the court 
granted the motion, the defendants would have to try this case on the merits 
and possibly depose the experts, but these expenditures are not above and 
beyond what the defendants would have spent had the experts been timely 
designated. 
The trial court's decision is factually inaccurate and without legal 
merit or analysis. The trial court refused to accept the exigencies of the 
circumstances. Instead, the trial court abused is discretion by seemingly 
trying to create procedural balance in the case, while ignoring the merits of 
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the Petitioner's motion. This Court should reverse and remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in applying the proper facts and law to its 
analysis of Lippman's motion for more time to disclose expert witnesses. 
As such, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. 
DATED and SIGNED this h_ day of November, 2009 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
v^—^  
Brian P. Duncan 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND jUDlfeffiSBfe' 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
^- ..-. -• y ^ y / ^ >^ i^j ^ 
CHRIS LIPPMAN, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
DEEMCO INDUSTRIES. LLC, 
STEVEN V. DEEM, GP III Incorporated, a 
Utah Corporation, REYNOLDS 
FINANCIAL. LLC a Utah limited liability 
company, SBS BUSINESS CONSULTING, 
OWEN SALKIN, COLD WELL BANKER 
RESIDENTIAL BROKERAGE COMPANY, 
and JOHN and JANE Does I-X 
Defendants. 
DECISION 
Case Number: 060902994 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
Plaintiff's Third Molion to Amend Scheduling Order to Allow More Time for Disclosure 
of Experts is denied. 
The original scheduling order in this case was entered on March 17, 2007. The Amended 
Scheduling Order, which extended deadlines for disclosure of experts by plaintiff, set an April 1, 
2008 deadline. Expert discovery was to be completed by June 10, 2008. Apparently, a Second 
Motion to Amend the scheduling order was filed by plaintiff in April 2008 asking to extend the 
expert designation date to May 31, 2008. While defendants did not oppose the motion it was 
never submitted to the court and no decision was ^iven which granted the extension. Now, 
nearly a year later plaintiff seeks to extend the expert designation again but does not even specify 
how long an extension is being requested. Furthermore, the time to request an extension has 
expired. Defendants oppose the motion arguing that an extension will result in reopening expert 
discovery and will serve to prejudice them by causing additional expense and a delay in the trial 
which has already been scheduled. 
Decision - Plaintiff's Third Motion to Amend Schedulir 
VD29012077 pages: 3 
060902384 DEEMCO iNDUSTRiES LLC 
Decision 
Lippman vs Deemco 
Case Number 060902994 
Page two 
The court notes that this case was filed in 2006. There have been numerous amendments 
to the pleadings by plaintiff Now, nearly a year after the designation of experts was to be done, 
plaintiff seeks to amend the deadline for designating experts for apparently an indeterminate 
period of time. Such an extension would, of course, necessitate extending the time for expert 
discovery. Plaintiff cites an oversight on his part to secure this additional deadline and cites 
difficulty in obtaining experts to substantiate his claims. Frankly, plaintiff has been very 
dogmatic in requiring other parties to adhere to deadlines in this case which resulted in the 
Draconian result of admissions against the Deem defendants being entered and a resulting 
summary judgment against those defendants. He cannot now in good faith ask the court to grant 
him the leniency that he was so unwilling to give other parties in this case. Furthermore, he has 
already had the benefit of an extension in this case. If expert testimony is so vital as plaintiff 
insists, the court questions why it has been so difficult to locate an expert to substantiate 
plaintiffs claims. Presumably that information should have been gathered before the case was 
even filed and certainly within the deadline that plaintiff originally agreed to. Claims premised 
on the need for expert testimony should be filed based on that expert consultation not the other 
way around. 
Plaintiffs request foi extension is stale and without merit. Furthermore, in light of the 
prejudice that would result to defendants in reopening the case and specifically further delay in a 
trial on an old case, the motion is denied. 
Dated this / U dav of June, 2009 
PAMELA" G. HKFFE^NAN 
District-Court Judge 
Decision 
Lippman vs Deemco 
Case Number 060902994 
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